In absence of randomized-controlled experiments, identification is often aimed via instrumental variable (IV) strategies, typically two-stage least squares estimations. According to Bayes' rule, however, under a low ex ante probability that a hypothesis is true (e.g. that an excluded instrument is partially correlated with an endogenous regressor), the interpretation of the estimation results may be fundamentally flawed. This paper argues that rigorous theoretical reasoning is key to design credible identification strategies, the foremost, finding candidates for valid instruments. We discuss prominent IV analyses from the macro-development literature to illustrate the potential benefit of structurally derived IV approaches.
INTRODUCTION
In many fields of the social sciences, randomized controlled experiments are rare and difficult. This is particularly true for macroeconomic hypotheses that need to be tested with aggregate data. 1 Examples include the potentially fundamental role of institutional or cultural factors for economic development and international trade (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2006; Guiso et al., 2006 Guiso et al., , 2009 Tabellini, 2008 Tabellini, , 2010 Becker and Woessmann, 2009, Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012 ; among many others). Identification of causal effects in this and the related literature is often aimed via instrumental variable (IV) strategies, typically based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations. Existence of causal effects of interest is typically viewed as being well supported by the estimation results, if (i) in the reduced form regression of the treatment (first stage) the coefficients on the excluded instruments are statistically significant, (ii) in the structural equation the coefficient on the treatment is statistically significant, and (iii) intuitive reasoning suggests the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation.
This paper argues that these criteria are insufficient to gain confidence that a hypothesized causal relationship actually exists. In the language of statistical research, hypothesis testing based on these criteria alone may generate too many 'false positives'. In medical and pharmaceutical research, the attitude of 'letting the data speak' has been heavily criticized in view of the many at first glance promising experimental outcomes of new treatments which often times could not be replicated in follow-up studies (Ioannidis, 2005) . We argue that a potentially large body of research in empirical macroeconomics, particularly but not exclusively when based on aggregate data, is potentially even more problematic. According to Bayes' rule, under a low ex ante probability that a hypothesis at some stage of the estimation is true, the interpretation of IV results may be fundamentally flawed. That is, there may still be a high probability that the hypothesized structural relation does not exist, even when the estimated coefficients of interest are statistically significantly different from zero. To see this, consider the null hypothesis that a causal effect from A to B does not exist and therefore that the true coefficient of interest in a regression is zero. The level of significance in, say, a t-test, is the maximum tolerated probability to reject the null hypothesis given that A in fact does not have an effect on B. What we are interested in, however, is the probability that the null hypothesis is indeed false given that we reject it. The chosen level of significance in a t-test is one determinant of this probability, but not the only one. It interacts with the ex ante probability that A causally affects B. This is the ultimate reason why letting the data speak alone can never suffice and rigorous theoretical reasoning is indispensable for deriving proper identification strategies.
Specifically, we argue that in IV analysis, the credibility about a causal effect of interest is only as credible as the weakest theoretical argument among those motivating the structural equation and the first stage relationship. Particularly the choice of instruments in many applications is often based on simple intuitive reasoning rather than on rigorous analysis to support logical consistency of the hypothesized causal effect. We illustrate how formal theory can motivate both that the instrument is relevant and that the exclusion restriction holds.
In the coming section, we demonstrate the importance of the ex ante probability that a hypothesized causal relationship exists for economic conclusions by applying Bayes' rule. In section 3, we clarify the importance of Bayes' rule for instrument relevance and discuss the difficulty of finding exgenous instruments. Section 4 illustrates how to use rigorous economic theory to justify both instrument relevance and validity of the exclusion restriction in an IV approach that potentially identifies the causal effect of changing the economy's human capital stock on (long-run) per capita income. We relate our illustrative dynamic general equilibrium model to the prominent studies by Tabellini (2010) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) and discuss how it supports their IV strategies and results.
Our paper is part of an ongoing debate about potential flaws in making causal inferences using IV approaches. Our contribution is to shift the focus to the ex ante probability that a causal relationship exists, motivated by Ioannidis (2005) , and the important role of economic theory for empirical research in social sciences. Murray (2006) , Angrist and Pischke (2009), and Wooldridge (2010) , for instance, discuss in an accessible way the potential econometric inconsistencies of IV estimates generated by endogenous or weak instruments. 2 More specifically, Staiger and Stock (1997) , Stock et al. (2002) and Stock and Yogo (2005) study the sampling distribution of IV estimators under weak instruments. Kiviet and Niemczyk (2014) examine the sampling distribution of IV estimators under endogeneity of some of the instruments. They conclude that instrument weakness has much stronger effects on the finite sample distribution than instrument endogeneity. When the instrument is endogenous but not very weak the finite sample distribution of the IV estimator tends to be close to normal with probability mass centred around its probability limit. Other research examines ways to test for regressor endogeneity and examines the finite sample performance of such tests, see e.g. Kiviet (2017) and Kiviet and Pleus (2017) . 3 These strands of the literature do not address, however, the potential of rigorously formulated economic theory to enhance credibility of identification strategies. By contrast, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Deaton (2010) emphasize that obtaining useful results of randomized controlled economic policy interventions in developing countries requires structural empirical models on behavioural responses to interventions. That kind of economic literature does not, however, relate its arguments to the ex ante probability that an effect of interest exists. Moreover, the applications we have in mind are not randomized controlled economic policy interventions in development microeconomics, but those at the macro level where randomized controlled trials are not feasible and IV strategies are potentially useful.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BAYES' RULE -A QUICK REMINDER
Suppose, we are interested in studying the effect of a treatment D (e.g. a regionspecific policy intervention) on an outcome Y (e.g. per capita income in the region). Assume that D has been randomly assigned. Consider a regression of the outcome variable Y on the treatment variable D:
where U is an error term with E(U) = 0 and Cov(D,U) = 0. We call eq. (1) the structural equation. Suppose we find that the coefficient on D is significantly different from zero, according to the p-value which is lower than some chosen significance level a (typically, five or one percent). Typically, we interpret such estimate as evidence supporting that D causes Y. 4 What is the probability that in this case D actually affects Y?
To motivate that rigorous theoretical considerations are important for empirical analysis, let us briefly illustrate the importance of the ex ante probability that a hypothesis is true or false by recalling Bayes' rule.
Let p denote the ex ante probability that the null hypothesis 'a causal relationship of D to Y does not exist' (c 1 ¼ 0) is true and 1Àp the ex ante probability that it is false (i.e. that the relationship exists). The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis although being true (type I error) is denoted by a Prfc 1 ¼ 0 rejectjc 1 ¼ 0 trueg. In a regression analysis, the p-value refers to the probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme than the one observed when the null hypothesis is true. The probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis although it is false (type II error), is denoted by b Prfc 1 ¼ 0 not rejectjc 1 ¼ 0 falseg.
Using Figure 1 , according to Bayes' rule, the probability that the null hypothesis of no effect is indeed false in our regression example (i.e. the true coefficient on D is non-zero), given that we reject it, reads as
where R (1Àp)/p can be interpreted as the ratio of false null hypotheses (i.e. the number of instances where there is an effect) to true null hypotheses (i.e. the number of instances where there is no effect) out of the universe of possible hypotheses. It follows from (2) that if, and only if, R(1Àb) > a, then Prfc 1 ¼ 0 falsejc 1 ¼ 0 rejectg [ 0:5. In this case, it is more likely that there is indeed an effect given that we found a 'significant' coefficient than that the null hypothesis is true (i.e. there is actually no effect despite our seemingly supporting evidence). As a numerical example, suppose that the ex ante probability that D causally affects Y is fifty-fifty (p = 0.5) which could mean that theoretical arguments in favour of the hypothesis are quite convincing. Also suppose that we require a standard level of significance (i.e. a small probability of a type I error) of five percent and that the probability of a type II error is only 20 percent. Such a low b requires a sufficiently large sample size, for instance. 5 The power of the test, 1Àb, is then 80 percent. With a = 0.05, b = 0.2 and R = 1, the probability that the null hypothesis is indeed false, given a coefficient on D that is significantly different from zero, is about 94 percent, according to (2). In this case, empirical support for a causal effect of D on Y, provided that treatment assignment D is properly randomized, is quite strong. If the sample size is small like in many applications in empirical macroeconomics, such that the power of the test drops to 50 percent (b = 0.5), for a = 0.05 , we still obtain a probability that the null hypothesis is false given that we reject it based on our regression estimate of almost 91 percent.
However, now suppose the claim that some variable has an effect is based on some weakly substantiated theory, such that the ex ante probability p that the null hypothesis is true is 90 percent (i.e. R = 1/9). In this case, Prfc 1 ¼ 0 falsejc 1 ¼ 0 rejectg ¼ 0:53. Thus, although a regression coefficient of interest may be significantly different from zero at the five percent level in a seemingly robust way, which many scholars would interpret as strong support that the causal effect of D on Y exists, existence of an effect is not much more probable than its non-existence. If again a = 0.05, b = 0.5, and the ex ante probability that D causally affects Y would be a mere five percent (p = 0.95), then the conclusion on the basis of a 'significant' coefficient on D that D causally affects Y would only be true with a probability of about one third.
In sum, also apart from endogeneity issues, empirical evidence which lends support to the hypothesis that a causal relationship exists simply based on a 'statistically significant' coefficient is quite likely to be misleading if the suggested effect is sufficiently 'surprising' to begin with. In fact, the notion of a 'surprising' result may just reflect a high ex ante probability p (meaning that R is low), giving rise to a likely 'false positive' result. We now turn to the case where D is endogenous and argue that even if the ex ante probability for c 1 ¼ 0 is low, the choice of a 'surprising' instrument for D at the first stage can lead to incredible estimates.
IDENTIFICATION BASED ON INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
We have just seen that, even in randomized controlled experiments in which the dose of treatment is truly exogenous, empirical estimates may lead to misleading conclusions. In the absence of randomized controlled experiments, the key problem to identify causal effects via regression analysis is potential endogeneity. 5. In general, the power of the test of the null hypothesis c 1 ¼ 0 against the specific alternative that c 1 takes on a given alternative value depends on the sample size as well as the specific value of c 1 under the alternative hypothesis.
More specifically, consider again the regression model of outcome Y on treatment D in eq. (1). Suppose D is not randomly assigned but potentially correlated with the unobserved determinants of Y, i.e. the error term U, so that Cov(D,U) 6 ¼ 0. In this case, the OLS estimator of c 1 is inconsistent. For instance, consider the debate on the factors that fundamentally cause economic exchange or economic growth, like institutions (e.g. the extent of property rights protection and schooling systems) or cultural factors (e.g. religious similarity and common language between trading partners). In a regression analysis, there may be unobserved factors (omitted variables) which affect, for instance, the included regressors (e.g. measures of the quality of institutions) and the dependent variable (e.g. per capita income) at the same time. Applied general equilibrium theory typically suggests that many parameters that capture preferences, production technology (or costs involved in production-related decisions of firms and households) and endowments are candidates for such third factors.
A widely accepted possibility to identify causal effects when Cov(D,U) 6 ¼ 0 is to employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The IV framework assumes that we have access to an instrument Z that affects the treatment D while it is uncorrelated with the error term of eq. (1), i.e. Cov(Z,U) = 0. The first condition canto some extentbe verified empirically, while the second condition can only be established based on theoretical arguments.
More specifically, we can express the relationship between the treatment and the instrument as
where V is an error term with E(V) = 0 and Cov(Z,V) = 0. 6 eq. (3) is referred to as the first stage or the reduced form for D.
Instrument relevance
As argued above, rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient d 1 in eq. eq. 3) is equal to zero does not definitely confirm the first stage relationship between D and Z as the probability that the null is indeed false depends on the ex ante probability that Z causally affects D, see eq. (2). A useful check to gain confidence in the relevance of an (excluded) instrument and the existence of the causal relationship posited by the structural equation is to consider the reduced form for the outcome Y. Substituting (3) into (1), we obtain the reduced form for the outcome Y:
In fact, since g 1 is the product of the first stage coefficient d 1 in eq. (3), and the coefficient c 1 in the structural eq.
(1), it can only be non-zero if both c 1 and d 1 differ from zero. Angrist and Pischke (2009) p. 213) require that the estimated g 1 is statistically significant, 6. To streamline the notation, the model set up in eqs. (1) and (3) omits additional exogenous control variables that are uncorrelated with the error terms. We can think of Y, D and Z as the residuals from regressions of the outcome, the treatment and the instrument on the additional control variables, respectively.
pointing out that 'if you can't see the causal relation of interest in the reduced form, it's probably not there'. 7 We will now argue that their statement extends to the consideration of ex ante probabilities. Again we can ask the question how likely it is that the coefficient g 1 truly differs from zero if we reject the null hypothesis that it is zero. To see this more clearly, recall g 1 ¼ d 1 c 1 to write down the probability that the null hypothesis of no effect of Z on Y is false given that it is rejected as:
Using the Fr echet inequalities (Fr echet, 1935) we can determine the lower bound of this joint probability as
and the upper bound as
To highlight the need for a good theory about both the structural equation and the first stage relationship, suppose that Prðd (7). That is, the ex ante probability that the instrument Z affects the outcome Y cannot exceed the ex ante probability that the instrument Z affects the treatment variable D, both conditional on rejecting the null hypothesis g 1 ¼ 0. Thus, even if the ex ante probability of a non-zero treatment effect on the outcome is high and we find that g 1 is statistically significant, when the instrument does not affect the treatment, rejection of the null hypothesis g 1 ¼ 0 does not mean much regarding the effect of the instrumental variable on the outcome. If, in addition, Prðc 1 ¼ 0 falsejg 1 ¼ 0 rejectÞ 0:5, which may well be the case if we do not have a convincing theory that supports the treatment effect, then Prðg 1 ¼ 0 falsejg 1 ¼ 0 rejectÞ is not even bounded away from zero (!), according to (6).
Thus, when relying on an instrumental variables framework, we should be all the more sceptical about seemingly 'creative' choices of instruments that have a low ex ante probability that the instrument causes the treatment even if the estimated coefficient is statistically significant in a reduced form equation.
Instrument exogeneity
The second condition for a valid instrument is exogeneity, i.e. a candidate instrument must not be correlated with the error term in eq. (1). 8 Practically, this condition rules out the existence of third variables, not included in eq. (1) and (3), that are correlated with both Y and Z. 9 The exogeneity condition has to be substantiated in the context of the specific application at hand using a priori 7. In fact, IV estimates can be severely biased if the instrument is weak, see e.g. Stock et al. (2002) and Kiviet and Niemczyk (2014) . 8. It is well known that violation of the exclusion restriction could imply that an IV coefficient is more biased than its OLS counterpart, see e.g. Hahn and Hausman (2005) and Kiviet and Niemczyk (2014) . 9. More precisely, this requirement has to hold after partialling out all other observed covariates, see footnote 3.
Let the Data Speak?
arguments. Typically, such arguments are more or less explicitly derived from economic theory. For instance, to estimate demand-side features, determinants of the supply side lend themselves as instruments. Section 4.2 provides a worked example in the context of schooling how rigorous theoretical reasoning can be used to argue both relevance and exogeneity of instrumental variables. Importantly, instrument exogeneity cannot in general be tested empirically. 10 To illustrate the difficulty to motivate exclusion restrictions, consider the widely accepted practice of using geographic information to construct instruments. Variables capturing regional variation in the proximity to or the availability of specific facilities / institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals and retail stores) are often used as instruments when the goal is to assess the causal effect of these facilities / institutions on economic outcomes such as earnings, employment or per capita income, see e.g. Card (1995) , Neumark et al. (2008) or Becker and Woessmann (2009) for prominent examples. 11 Using geographic variables as instruments is not innocuous, though, because they may violate the exclusion restriction if other locational (economic or cultural) factors are not controlled for. In fact, the location of settlements, agglomerations or industries is typically not random but a result of political, geographic or climatic factors that may well have influenced both instrument and outcome or may have affected third variables correlated with instrument and outcome. One may wish to determine the probability that any form of spatial interdependence relating to the instrument is irrelevant for the outcome using Bayes' rule. Unfortunately, this would require some hypothesis test for the exclusion restriction. Therefore, theory to justify the exclusion restriction is salient. Moreover, careful applications of IV techniques usually provide additional empirical evidence to support the hypothesis of instrument exogeneity, which, however, cannot be interpreted as a formal test.
We briefly discuss some prominent, controversially received literature that employs geographic distance as instrument. We start with the study of Becker and Woessmann (2009) who suggest that Protestant regions in 19th century Prussia had higher literacy rates and therefore higher per capita income compared to Catholic regions. The instrumental variable for Protestantism is the distance to Wittenberg, the home town of Martin Luther. Their basic argument is that 'distance to Wittenberg is indeed unrelated to a series of proxies for economic and educational development before 1517, including the pre-Luther placement of schools, universities, monasteries, and free imperial and Hanseatic cities and urbanization' (Becker and Woessmann, 2009, p. 532) . However, Edwards (2017) criticizes that they do not take into account systematic regional heterogeneity. He shows that regional effects are empirically important and are correlated with distance to Wittenberg. Therefore, he doubts that the instrument 10. When multiple instruments are available one could in principle conduct an overidentification test to test whether the instruments are valid. However, they still require to maintain an a priori exogeneity condition for the just-identified model, which often seems implausible in applied work, see e.g. Murray (2006) , Angrist and Pischke (2009) ch. 4) and Kiviet (2017) for a discussion. Kiviet (2019) suggests to test the exclusion restriction in a just identified model conditional on assuming a given value or range of values for the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term. 11. Also, other disciplines use geographic information as instruments, see e.g. the survey by Garabedian et al. (2014) on the medical literature.
fulfills the exclusion restriction. However, his regressions including region fixed effects imply that the distance instrument only captures within-region variation. This may contradict its theoretical idea, especially if regions are small. 12 Neumark et al. (2008) study the effect of Wal-Mart store openings on employment and earnings in the retail sector in US counties. They use distance to the Wal-Mart headquarters interacted with time to instrument store openings. The IV strategy exploits that Wal-Mart expanded from a local chain store to a national one by spreading out geographically to counties farther away. Thus, in a given year, the distance of a county from Wal-Mart's headquarters predicts the probability that a new store is opened. Basker (2007) questions the validity of the instrument and provides empirical evidence suggesting that the instrument may be correlated with third factors that also affect the performance of local labour markets. More specifically, Wal-Mart's headquarters lie in a rather rural area in the central south of the US while the metropolitan areas are located closer to the coasts. Thus, counties at the coasts differ systematically from counties in the centre not just in the timing of the opening of Wal-Mart stores but also in their population density, industry structure and other economically relevant characteristics.
RIGOROUSLY FOUNDING IDENTIFICATION STRATEGIES

Challenges
Summarizing the above, finding a good excluded instrument is notoriously difficult for at least two reasons. First, for its relevance, an excluded instrument should have a high ex ante probability of being partially correlated with the endogenous regressor in an important way, as argued above by exploiting Bayes' rule and the Fr echet inequalities. Otherwise, the instrument relevance assumption may be violated, leaving the IV estimate inconsistent. Second, the exclusion restriction is not easily justified. As known by every applied general equilibrium theorist, the exogenous factors of a theoretical model (i.e. the parameters characterizing technology, preferences, and endowments) typically pop up in many endogenous variables, except under special assumptions. In a theoretical model, special assumptions may be justified for the purpose of highlighting a specific economic mechanism. However, for instrument exogeneity, it is necessary to argue quite generally that an exogenous factor is not correlated with an endogenous variable that cannot be controlled for in the empirical model. Doing so typically requires rigorous theoretical analysis that advises us which explanatory variables of interest shall be treated as endogenous and which are candidate instruments.
The long-standing debate on formalization of economic theory has led to the conclusion that rigorous theoretical foundations are required to show that an intuition is consistent with mathematically proven conclusions derived under 12. Boppart et al. (2013) and Boppart et al. (2014) examine the role of variation in the population share of Protestants at the district level for educational test results of military conscripts in 19th century Switzerland. They use the distance to the historical centres of Protestantism (shorter distance of a district to Zurich and Geneva) as instrument for Protestantism. To mitigate the concern that the instrument violates the exclusion restriction, they also control for geographical and economic factors like altitude, population density, and the (closest) proximity to one of the six major Swiss cities.
explicit, transparent assumptions. It has even provided economists with confidence that testable, theoretical hypotheses are typically better founded in economic research than in other social sciences. However, when it comes to justify that an instrument is partially correlated with an endogenous regressor and at the same time fulfils the exclusion restriction, seemingly intuitive (verbal) reasoning is the standard in many successfully published empirical applications. We will now illustrate how economic theory can rather be used to rigorously derive an IV strategy in the context of schooling and its effect on per capita income.
Illustration: The macroeconomic effects of schooling
Estimating the causal effect of the amount of human capital in an economy (typically measured by the average years of schooling or a measure of the population average of cognitive skills) on aggregate income and/or investment in physical capital is a long-standing issue. 13 Finding an excluded instrument requires a dynamic general equilibrium model that suggests an observable exogenous factor affecting investment and income only through its effect on human capital and not independently of it. We now demonstrate how such a candidate instrument can be derived.
Theoretical set up
To fix ideas and illustrate the challenge IV estimations based on aggregate data may impose, consider the following perfectly competitive environment in continuous time. Suppose (per capita) income y is equal to output of a unit mass of identical firms producing a single consumption good, chosen as numeraire. Production function f depends on the (per capita) stocks of physical and human capital devoted to production, denoted by k Y and h Y , respectively. We specify
A > 0, 0 < a < 1. Physical capital depreciates at constant rate d K [ 0. The (per capita) stock of human capital in the economy, h, accumulates according to 14
B > 0, 0 < g ≤ 1, where d H [ 0 is the human capital depreciation rate and 1Às is the (average) fraction of time devoted to education. The case of constant returns in educational production, g = 1 , is treated in the seminal paper on endogenous growth theory by Lucas (1988) . It implies that human capital grows without bound, a feature that has been criticized (e.g. Temple, 2001) . We will therefore focus on the case of decreasing returns in educational production, g < 1, and relegate the discussion of the case g = 1 to the appendix. 15 We follow Lucas (1988) 13. See e.g. Barro (1991) , Bils and Klenow (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2007) , among others. 14. We denote by _ xðtÞ dxðtÞ=dt the derivative of a variable x with respect to time t. The time index is omitted whenever this does not lead to confusion. 15. In the appendix, we argue that the derived identification strategy for determining the causal relation from human capital to per capita income for the case where g = 1 is similar to the case where g < 1; see Proposition A.1 and its discussion. We also argue, however, that identification of the causal effect of schooling on physical capital investment may be impossible when based on assumption g = 1.
to allow for human capital externalities. That is, total factor productivity (TFP), A, may depend on the (per capita) human capital level h. However, because a single firm has mass zero, the relationship is not taken into account by firms. Thus, they take A as given when choosing inputs to maximize profits. We specify
a > 0, b ≥ 0. 16 Parameter a may be viewed as capturing historically rooted factors affecting TFP. There is an infinitely living, representative household with unit time endowment. It lends its non-human assets, k, to the representative firm and inelastically supplies human capital that is not devoted to education (i.e. fraction s of amount h) to the labour market. Thus, k Y ¼ k and h Y ¼ sh. Using these equilibrium conditions and (10) in (8), per capita income can be written as
The amount of non-human assets accumulates according to
where w denotes the wage rate per unit of human capital and r denotes the interest rate net of depreciation. Let c(t) denote the household's consumption of the numeraire good at time t. The household chooses the consumption path and time allocation variable, s, to maximize intertemporal utility
subject to (9) and (12), q > 0, r > 0. Initial values of stock variables, hð0Þ ¼ h 0 [ 0 and kð0Þ ¼ k 0 [ 0, are given.
Equilibrium analysis
The definition of an equilibrium is relegated to the appendix. We focus the equilibrium analysis on the long run and look for a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE), where all variables grow at a constant (possibly zero) rate. Long-run values are denoted by superscript (*).
Proposition 1 Suppose g < 1. There exists a BGE, such that the key variables are stationary and given by
16. The reader may excuse that we use a and b as production elasticities in this section while they denoted the probability of a type I and type II error in section 2, respectively.
Proof. See appendix.& Since the long-run level of human capital (h Ã ) is stationary if g < 1 (i.e. under decreasing returns in educational production), there is no TFP growth in BGE. Thus, also the level of physical capital is stationary and the long run investment in physical capital, denoted by I Ã , is equal to the amount of physical capital that is depreciating, I Ã d K k Ã . Now consider the impact of an increase in the marginal benefit B to devote time to education. On the one hand, an increase in B provides an incentive to shift the time allocation towards education [as @ 2 _ h @ð1ÀsÞ@B [ 0, according to (9)]. On the other hand, however, the resulting increase in the (long run) level of human capital raises to the same extent the marginal (opportunity) costs of doing so in the form of foregone labour income. In sum, in BGE, the long run value of the time allocation variable, s Ã , is independent of B. Similarly, an increase in TFP parameter a, by raising the long-run wage rate, raises both the benefit and the opportunity costs of schooling alike. None of the long run values in (14)-(17) are affected by initial levels of stock variables, h 0 and k 0 . Consequently, the following result holds.
Corollary 1 Suppose g < 1. An increase in educational productivity, B, affects long run investment in physical capital, I Ã , and long run per capita income, y Ã , only through a change in the long run level of human capital, h Ã , but not through a behavioural response on the long run level of the time allocation variable, s Ã . An increase in TFP parameter a directly affects per capita income (y Ã ) and investment (I Ã ) without affecting s Ã or h Ã . Initial levels of human and physical capital, h 0 and k 0 , respectively, do not directly affect s Ã , h Ã , I Ã , y Ã .
Most importantly, Corollary 1 suggests that the productivity in both human capital formation and final output production do not affect the (possibly unobserved) allocation of human capital between labor supply and educational production. As shown in Grossmann et al. (2015) , the results are robust to changing the human capital formation process to reflect privately financed (and, possibly, publicly subsidized) wage costs of teachers rather than time opportunity costs.
Structural derivation of IV strategies
Based on Corollary 1, we can now discuss potential IV strategies. Adding subscript i to denote regions (or countries), we use (17) to write
where c 0 a 1Àa log a, c 1 1Àaþb 1Àa , c 2 1 1Àa , and U i a log s Ã i À a 1Àa logðq i þ d K Þ. Based on (18), we may estimate the causal effect of an increase in the level of human capital on (the log of) per capita income in a sample of regions or countries. 17 We assume that elasticities a, b, g, and depreciation rates d K , d H , are the same for all regions, whereas productivity parameters a i , B i , and the time preference rate q i are interpreted as being institutionally or culturally rooted and thus may differ across regions. q i may be viewed as capturing patience. Zilibotti (2008, 2013) strongly argue that patience is indeed a fundamental determinant of economic development that can explain the regional variation in per capita income. According to (14) and (17), the time preference rate q i affects the error term directly and via the long run value of the time allocation variable, s Ã i , which is unobservable. It also affects h Ã i , according to (15) . Consequently, if q i were unobservable and differed across regions or countries, h Ã i would be correlated with the error term and thus an OLS estimate of c 1 would be biased.
By contrast, according to Corollary 1, the productivity in human capital formation, B i , critically affects h Ã i , without affecting s Ã i , i.e. is unrelated to the error term, U i . The theoretical model thus suggests that an appropriate measure of B i may serve as a valid excluded instrument to address the mentioned endogeneity problem. The analogous reasoning applies to considering long run physical capital investment, I Ã i ¼ d K k Ã i , rather than per capita income as dependent variable.
Application 1: Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) are interested in the effect of schooling on the growth rate of per capita income between 1960 and 2000. They estimate the following cross-country regression:
where H i is a measure of contemporaneous cognitive math and science skills (the average test score across pupils in primary to lower secondary education in country i, based on international student achievement tests and averaged over an extended period), y Ã i and y i0 denote i's GDP per capita in the year 2000 and 1960, respectively, x i are other controls (with coefficients c x ), and U i is the error term.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) employ the presence of an external exit exam (a country-specific dummy variable), Z i , hypothesized to positively affecting test scores H i , as excluded instrument in a 2SLS regression analysis. They argue that: 'External exit exam systems are a device to increase accountability in the school system that has been repeatedly shown to be related to better student achievement ' (p. 283) . Viewing H i as a measure of log h Ã i and excluded instrument Z i as a measure of educational productivity B i in the proposed theoretical 17. It is noteworthy that we must not control for the capital stock, since k Ã is proportionally related to h Ã , according to (16) . Otherwise, the rank condition would be violated.
model, the IV strategy correctly identifies c 1 , according to Corollary 1, (18) and (19) . Moreover, we may view initial GDP level y i0 in estimated equation (19) as being related to the historically rooted TFP parameter a i in (18) that entered the theoretical model. In this case, because of the term À log y i0 on the left-hand side of (19), the sign of c 2 could be positive or negative. The estimated c 2 in Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) is negative (typically interpreted as neoclassical convergence force). Most importantly and reassuringly in light of our theoretical considerations, the estimated c 1 is positive and highly significant. In sum, even though their empirical model is not structurally derived explicitly, both the identification strategy and estimates of Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) are as if it is, giving much credibility to their results.
Application 2: Tabellini (2010) Also based on a 2SLS regression analysis, Tabellini (2010) argues that, in addition to variation in human capital levels, differences in culturally transmitted values like 'generalized trust' that inhabitants within a region generally have on average towards other people can explain the variation of per capita income across European regions. The hypothesis is theoretically well-founded (Putnam, 1993; Zak and Knack, 2001) and gained empirical support (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997) , albeit causal empirical inference has been missing. To fill this gap, Tabellini (2010) estimates the structural equation
where y Ã i is the level of per capita income averaged over the period 1995-2000, H i is the gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary schools in 1960, Culture i denotes the contemporaneous cultural variable (in 1999-2000) , x i denotes other controls, and U i is the error term. Tabellini (2010) uses the literacy rate at the end of the 19th century and political institutions in the mid-19th century and earlier as instrumental variables, Z i , to address the potential endogeneity of culture.
We will now employ our theoretical considerations to uncover the assumptions under which Tabellini (2010) correctly identifies the effects of cultural variation across regions on per capita income. First, viewing H i as a measure of log h Ã i on the right-hand side of (18) without instrumenting human capital requires that H i is not correlated with the error term. That would hold if we viewed H i as measure for the productivity in human capital formation in the theoretical model, B i . Measures of Culture i like generalized trust are likely to be endogenous, because they may be related to patience as conceptualized by the time preference rate q i , which is contained in the error term (18). (Recall that also s Ã i depends on q i .) Generalized trust or other cultural measures may also be correlated with productivity parameters a i and B i that, in the theoretical model, are unrelated to U i . Thus, allowing Culture i to be related to a i , B i , x i , q i , excluded instruments may be related to a i , B i and x i , but must not be related to q i . In particular, suppose that TFP parameter a i (capturing historical roots) is determined by region i's literacy rate and political institutions in the distant past, denoted by h 0i and P i , respectively. Also, assume that h 0i and P i are uncorrelated with patience, q i that is conceptionally separated from the TFP parameter, a i , in our model. Also recall that we assumed B i to be captured by past enrolment rates, H i . Tabellini (2010) linearly regresses Culture i on h 0i , P i , H i and x i . Since a i , B i , and the initial human capital level, h 0i , are not contained in the theoretically derived error term U i , instruments Z i ¼ ðh 0i ; P i Þ fulfil the exclusion restrictions on grounds of our theoretical model under the assumption.
Tabellini (2010) also estimated a reduced form regression by leaving out Culture i in (20) and using Z i ¼ ðh 0i ; P i Þ instead as controls, in addition to H i and x i . He indeed finds significant coefficients on historical variables Z i in such an estimation, supporting the instrument relevance assumption. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients of the instrumented variable Culture i in the structural estimation (20) suggest rejecting the null hypothesis that c 2 ¼ 0.
The application illustrates the many steps and explicit assumptions necessary to rigorously motivate an identification strategy and attribute high ex ante probabilities to the non-zero effects. As a further caveat, our theoretical considerations that justify the identification strategies of both Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) and Tabellini (2010) presume that the economy is in steady state, at least approximately. At least, such assumption becomes visible when rigorously founding IV approaches. 18
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we demonstrated how a structural approach could help to obtain credible results of IV estimations. First, a rigorous theoretical foundation advises the researcher on candidates for valid, excluded instruments. Second, it enhances the ex ante probability that a hypothesized effect exists both at the first stage (instrument relevance) and at the estimation of the structural equation. According to Bayes' rule, the ex ante probability critically determines the conditional probability that the null hypothesis (of no effect) is indeed false given that it is rejected at conventionally employed significance levels. Conventional robustness checks are not sufficient to prevent researchers from jumping to erroneous conclusions, if the theoretical reasoning of a hypothesized causal effect is weak to begin with.
In the empirical macro-development literature, new data cannot be readily generated and are often of aggregate nature. Thus, replication analysis typically is more challenging than in medical and pharmaceutical research where the same experiment can just be redone. Replication studies are also (too) rarely published in highly reputable outlets even when results contradict the original ones. 'False positive' results could thus become conventional wisdom for an extensive period. 19 As a result, researchers may have distorted incentives that could foster data mining (i.e. pre-testing) in the search of seemingly relevant, excluded instrumental 18. Having identified the critical assumptions, we could numerically examine transitional dynamics of the theoretical model to check whether the exclusion restrictions are largely supported also off steady state. 19. In the Online-Appendix, we discuss two widely received IV studies that exploit aggregate data and have been falsified by later work. See Albouy (2012) on Acemoglu et al. (2001) , who study the effect of higher institutional quality (property rights protection) on economic development, and Spring and Grossmann (2015) on Guiso et al. (2009) , who examine the effect of closer cultural proximity on international goods trade. We discuss the approaches from a theoretical point of view and suggest what can be learnt from the replication studies in future empirical research.
variables. Its choices may be ex post rationalized by some intuitive reasoning as a substitute for elaborate theoretical considerations. It is well-known, however, again based on Bayesian arguments, that pre-testing variables and fishing out the significant ones in regression analysis leads to invalid inference (e.g. Leamer, 1978) . Improved standards for empirical analyses that include structural modelling could also mitigate the well-known 'publication bias' that incentivizes to generate significant coefficient estimates by testing ex ante improbable hypotheses.
and long run levels ofh he Àĝ y ,k ke Àĝ y ,ỹ ye Àĝ y are stationary but indeterminate (i.e. generally depend on initial conditions, h 0 and k 0 ).
Proof. Using g = 1 in (24) implies that k/l = B/w. Thus, g w ¼ g l À g k and, according to (25), g l ¼ q þ d H À B.Using r = 1 in (27), we can write r ¼ g c þ q. Thus, according to (26), Àg k ¼ g c . Hence,
We seek for a BGE where r and s are stationary and both labour and non-labour income grow at the same rate as consumption, which is a candidate for a steady state, according to (12). If s is stationary, the growth rate of labour income reads as g w þ g h , which we set equal to g c in search for a BGE. Combining g h ¼ g c À g w with (35) confirms (32). Using g = 1 in (9), we have g h ¼ Bð1 À sÞ À d H . Combining the latter with (32) confirms (33). Note thatŝ \ 1 if B > q. Finally, according to (11) and _ s ¼ 0, we have g y ¼ ag k þ ð1 À a þ bÞg h . Substituting both g h ¼ĝ h and g y ¼ g k into the latter equation confirms (34). It is also easy to check that the transversality conditions (22) hold. The reminder of the proof is obvious.& According to Proposition A.1, in the case g = 1 rather than g < 1, we should regress the growth rate of per capita income on the growth rate of human capital in a panel analysis with countries or regions as observational units. According to (32) and (34), we could again use a measure of educational productivity B as excluded instrument in a 2SLS approach, since in BGE a change in B affects per capita income growth rateĝ y only through its impact onĝ h .
However, when it comes to the effect of schooling on investment in physical capital, the appropriate IV strategy is less clear in the case g = 1. Gross investment reads as I _ k þ d K k, i.e. I ¼ ðg k þ d K Þk. Since g k ¼ĝ y and k ¼keĝ y in BGE, long run gross investment can be written asÎ ðĝ y þ d K Þkeĝ y . Thus, we have
First, there is the difficulty that the effect of a change in long run growth rateĝ on bothÎ and logÎ is non-linear. A first-order approximation may be acceptable to deal with that problem, such that (36) may be written as
where U is the error term that includes logk, c 0 is a constant, and c 1 is the coefficient of interest. More fundamentally, however, an increase in B does not only affect physical capital investment viâ
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